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ABStrAct: Organizations with exceptional operational performance have generally achieved this status 
through management’s diligence encouraging the workforce to innovate.  the use of suggestion boxes 
to collect process improvement suggestions from the workforce is one such example, but they are not 
always successful. Some organizations do a good job collecting great ideas from their workers, both staff 
and managers, while others see little result from their efforts.  This paper presents a formal model of the 
(dis)incentives for entrepreneurial behavior in organizations.  the model extends research on the stigma 
of failure into organizations by examining the implications of more conservative and more experimental 
organizational cultures on the incentives for entrepreneurial action by the corporate-funded employee. 
the models explain how a forgiving organization that is willing to accept failure as well as success will 
lead to more product and process innovation.  contrariwise, it explains how a bureaucratic organization 
will rarely innovate because of its low tolerance for unsuccessful ventures.
Keywords: corporate entrepreneurship, process improvement, conceptual model
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1. InTrOducTIOn
SCM almost invariably involves the pursuit of effi-
ciency; it is the objective function of the operations 
manager par excellence. Yet because of the focus on 
efficiency the processes by which new efficiencies 
are designed, experimented, revealed and put into 
place can easily get lost. consider Wal-Mart. thanks 
to its well-designed distribution apparatus, its perfor-
mance is perhaps without peer. Its low cost supply 
chain enables it to profitably sell more goods and ser-
vices than any other company on the planet.  And yet, 
by focusing on Wal-Mart’s efficiency at profitably get-
ting product into the hands of customers, the casual 
observer may miss the processes involved in explor-
ing new ideas to become more efficient.  According to 
one close observer of the firm, it is “easy to overlook 
the experiments. Wal-Mart has never been afraid to 
step gingerly into a business, or a way of doing busi-
1 We are greatly thankful to the Office of the Secretary of the United States Dept of Defense for providing the necessary funds for this re-
search. We are also thankful to retired rear Admiral Jim Greene, the Naval Postgraduate School Acquisition research chair, Prof. Keith 
Snider, director of the Acquisitions research Program, and to John Dillard, Brad Naegle and rene rendon for their insights into the dynam-
ics of the US Dept of Defense major acquisition programs.
ness, stumble around, figure it out, and then take it 
chain wide.” (Fishman, 2006 p. 36).  consider General 
Electric.  Its successful deployment of Six-Sigma is the 
process improvement benchmark for any organiza-
tion engaged in total quality management.  Wal-Mart, 
General Electric and Monsanto belong to a set of no-
table corporations that have gone great lengths to de-
velop an entrepreneurial culture that supports their 
continuous improvement and innovation efforts.  By 
focusing on efficiency, we are at peril of ignoring the 
fundamental processes of ScM experimentation, dot-
ted with successes and failures. the experimentation 
process needs to be better understood.
In this paper we take up this challenge. Based on a sem-
inal study by Landier (2005), who examines why coun-
tries and regions differ in their cultural acceptance of 
entrepreneurial failure, we explore the entrepreneurial 
aspect of process improvement. In some countries and 
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regions, entrepreneurial failure is stigmatized; yet, in 
others, little social negativity is attached to failure.  The 
term “stigma” refers to an attribute that is deeply dis-
crediting that reduces “a whole and usual person to a 
tainted, discounted one” (Goffman, 1963, p. 3; Sutton & 
Callahan, 1987, p. 406).  For example, while failed en-
trepreneurs are often stigmatized in France and Japan, 
a culture exists in california’s Silicon Valley in which 
failure is practically a badge of honor (Bengtsson, 2005; 
Saxonian, 1994). 
Landier captured this basic phenomenon in a model 
of asymmetric information.  In his study he explains 
that, when choosing potential projects, entrepreneurs 
in conservative cultures will pursue suboptimal, but 
safe, projects.  If, in turn, they fail in these pursuits, 
this will indeed indicate that they are most likely 
unable to carry entrepreneurial activities to fruition. 
this information is circulated via a stigma of failure, 
which may be understood as a social mechanism for 
conveying information about the quality of individu-
als.  In contrast, in experimental cultures, all entrepre-
neurs are willing to undertake risky projects that are 
more likely to fail, but provide great pay-off in case of 
success.  therefore, a failure event conveys less infor-
mation about the quality of that entrepreneur, given 
the risk that was incurred.  Hence, it makes less sense 
for stakeholders in this environment to penalize the 
entrepreneurs for failures, and the stigma is not at-
tached to failed entrepreneurs.
We hybridize Landier’s model with the literature on 
corporate entrepreneurship, which is defined as the 
process by which one or more individuals instigate 
a new organization or innovation within an existing 
organization (Sharma & Chrisman, 1999, p. 18).  Cor-
porate entrepreneurship is characterized by innova-
tive, experimental behaviors that have a high prob-
ability of failure (Miller, 1983; Thomke, 1998). Several 
researchers have already examined factors influenc-
ing the creation of a corporate “atmosphere” in which 
entrepreneurial behaviors may flourish or be sup-
pressed and have identified a potential role for how 
failure is managed by an organization (Burgelman, 
1983; Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990). According to Farson 
and Keyes (2002), “[N]owhere is the fear of failure 
more intense and debilitating than in the competitive 
world of business, where a mistake can mean losing a 
bonus, a promotion, or even a job.”
Prominent business leaders such as Jack Welch and 
Robert Shapiro appeared to have noted the effect of 
managers’ fear of failure on their choices.  During 
his tenure as cEO of Monsanto, Shapiro observed 
that employees were terrified of failing. Thus, he at-
tempted to change perceptions about failure in or-
der to encourage risk-taking.  Jack Welch attempted 
to suppress fear of failure at General Electric by “re-
warding failure.”  Such prominent efforts at manag-
ing failure in a positive way only serve to underline 
the reality that failure is stigmatized to some signifi-
cant extent in many organizations.  Yet, the mech-
anisms underlying this phenomenon are still not 
well understood.  In a recent review, Kuratko and 
colleagues state that significant research questions 
remain; in particular, “research is needed to further 
clarify the linkage between the presence of specific 
qualities in an organizational context and individu-
als’ (such as middle-level managers) decisions to 
act entrepreneurially” (Kuratko, Ireland, Covin, & 
Hornsby, 2005, p. 711).
the following section introduces economic models 
of six cases that describe different entrepreneur-
ial scenarios.  The first case is the risk neutral self-
financed entrepreneur; it is a useful benchmark to 
compare with all other entrepreneurial situations. 
Next we analyze two cases where the entrepreneur 
depends on a venture capitalist to funds its initia-
tive; in one case the financial market encourages ex-
perimentation, and in the other case the market is 
conservative, and readily penalizes failure.  In the 
last three cases, the entrepreneur holds a long-term 
relationship with the corporation as an employee; 
each of the three cases evaluates different levels of 
tolerance regarding failure in the workplace.
2. The Model
2.1 Case I:  Self-financed Entrepreneur
We begin by considering a self-financed entrepre-
neur. this is a useful benchmark because the risk-
neutral, self-financed entrepreneur can make deci-
sions unaffected by the market’s imperfections.In period 0, the entrepreneur initiates a project that matures in period 2.  Before the project starts, the en-trepreneur expects the project to have probability πH of being successful, πM of being mediocre and πL of be-ing a total failure. These probabilities are true only if the entrepreneur is intrinsically competent — a fact unbeknownst to him.  The manager may be competent (with probability θ) or not.  If he is not competent, the project will necessarily fail.In period 1, the manager receives a private signal – high, medium or low probability (pH, pM or pL) – indi-
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  (1)Clearly, pH > pM > pL.  For example:  if pH = 80%, pM = 30% and pL = 0%, it means that the signal received in period 1 is that the project has 80% chance of being success-ful, or 30% chance of being successful, or that it will fail for sure.
A self-financed entrepreneur would certainly continue if he receives a signal pH.  It does not mean that the project will certainly succeed (that pesky 20% chance of failure still exists!).  For example, if the project is worth X = $1Million, there is pH probability of getting that return, and (1 - pH) probability of not gaining it. So, the expected value of the project at the time he re-ceives the signal is pH X = $800k.If the same entrepreneur receives a signal pM, he may or may not continue.  He knows that he is a good man-
ager; otherwise, his signal would definitely be pL.  So, 
he might continue if the expected payoff is greater 
than the payoff of starting all over again with a new project, which may be more successful or not.  Keep-ing with the example, the expected value of continuing this project is just pM X = $300k.  If the self-funded en-trepreneur abandons the project, he starts a new ven-ture which requires another start up cost I. Let’s say that I = $100k, πH = 40%, πM = πL = 30% and θ = 40%. This new venture would have an expected value of (πHpH + πMpM)X - I = (32% + 9%)$1M - $100k = $310K.  Since continuing is worth $300k, a risk-neutral, self-funded entrepreneur would prefer to start over.If the entrepreneur receives a signal pL, he is sure that the project is a dud.  However, he does not know if it was his fault or not:  the signal does not let him know if he is a competent manager.  The pool of failed entrepre-
neurs includes incompetent managers (Prob = 1 – θ) and unlucky competent managers (Prob = θ πL).  By receiving the signal pL, the probability that he is a com-petent manager is now reduced to:
  (2)
An entrepreneur with prior entrepreneurial expe-
rience follows a different decision process.  Figure 
1 shows the transition diagram with four states of 
competence (reputation) and the probabilities to 
transition from one state to the next.  All entrepre-
neurs are originated from state 0 (no prior experi-
ence).  Initial experience moves them from state 0 
to states G (good manager), U (good manager, but 
unknown to himself), or B (bad manager, unknown 
to himself).  After n experiences, an entrepreneur 
that has seen pH or pM at least once knows that he is 
a good manager, and finds himself in state G.  If the 
manager has only seen pL, he does not know if he is 
good or not, and maybe he is in state B (which he 
will never leave) or in state U (which he might even-
tually leave, if he continues long enough).  the prob-
ability that he is in state U, given that he has seen pL 
in all n ventures that he has experienced, is:
  (3)Clearly, as n increases, θ’n approaches 0.  In our exam-ple, suppose that n = 3, and the entrepreneur observed pL each time.  Hence, θ’n = 0.77%.  The risk-neutral en-trepreneur initiates yet another project only if:
  (4)
In summary, a self-financed entrepreneur, being risk 
neutral and without reputation concerns, eventually 
is able to make a sound estimate whether he is capa-
ble of leading an idea into a successful venture.  Most 
important, this analysis indicates the value of the pri-
vate information that the entrepreneur receives in the 
first few steps into the venture (period 1).
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Figure 1. Transition diagram (4 states)
2.2 Case II:  VC-funded Entrepreneur
Here, the venture capitalist provides initial capital 
I to fund a project with estimated earning potential 
X.2 the venture capitalist receives a compensation 
R if the project is successful and 0 if it fails.  the en-
trepreneur keeps X-R if successful and 0 otherwise. 
Entrepreneurs initiate projects if and only if:
the Vc-funded entrepreneur has to deal with mar-
ket imperfections because, unless he completes the 
project with some level of success, the Vc never 
knows if he is competent or not.  Moreover, the mar-
ket wants to ensure that competent managers always 
complete projects with signal pH to prevent strange 
behaviors such as “compulsive entrepreneurship” 
(an abnormal situation when the entrepreneur takes 
greater pleasure to start a new project than to bring a 
good project to fruition).  Also, the market wants the 
entrepreneur to treat projects with mediocre signal 
pM according to the typical willingness to take risk 
2 Subcases II-A and II-B have been proposed by Landier (2005). 
they are here presented for completeness.
in that market.  the market induces this behavior 
by adjusting the cost of capital for previously failed 
entrepreneurs in period 2.  If the cost of capital for 
failed entrepreneurs is R’, he will continue only if:
 
If the entrepreneur sees a signal pL, he has no incen-
tive to continue this venture, but he may consider 
starting a new venture if the cost of capital is less 
than its potential return (X > R’).  Since the market 
cannot distinguish competent managers among en-
trepreneurs that failed voluntarily after receiving a 
mediocre signal and those that failed because they 
received a poor signal, all failed entrepreneurs are 
subject to the same cost of capital.
Next, we compare two types of venture capital mar-
ket that differ according to their willingness to stig-
matize or forgive failure.
Subcase a) Conservative financial market
The conservative market is defined as the one that 
imposes high cost of capital to failed entrepreneurs. 
consequently, if the entrepreneur sees pM, his reac-
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tion is to continue with the project — even though 
he knows that it will provide only mediocre returns. 
Otherwise, his next venture will be funded with ex-
pensive capital.  that is, in this market:
Landier recognizes this as an incentive compatibility 
constraint, meaning that R’ is the venture capitalist’s 
return on successful entrepreneurship that induces 
the correct behavior for this market.
the risk-neutral venture capitalist, not knowing if 
competent managers lead the projects that she funds, 
requires a return on investment coherent with the 
project’s probability of success, considering the com-
position of the respective pools of managers:
…where θ’CM is the probability (in the eyes of the Vc) 
that a second-timer is a good manager.  In this market, 
the pool of failed entrepreneurs contains just entrepre-
neurs that received the signal pL.  Hence, θ’cM is:
  (6)
Since θ’CM < θ, we have that RCM < R’CM, which is 
consistent with the thesis that conservative mar-
kets assign higher cost of capital to failed entre-
preneurs.  However, if the entrepreneur sees pL, he 
knows that the project will fail; so, he drops it.  He 
may ask the Vc to invest in another idea — if the 
cost of capital justifies.  He starts a new project if 
An entrepreneur with prior experience exposes the 
venture capitalist to a different decision process. If 
the venture capitalist has access to information about 
the final outcome of each of the entrepreneur’s prior 
projects, the transition diagram in Figure 1 also repre-
sents the entrepreneur’s states of competence (repu-
tation) in a Vc-funded conservative market.  If the 
manager’s record shows at least one successful event, 
he is in state G.  If the record only shows failures, it 
implies that he has only seen pL.  Neither the Vc nor 
the entrepreneur himself knows if he is good or not. 
The probability that he is in state U, given that he has 
seen pL in all n ventures that he has experienced, is:
  (7)
to fund the next venture by experienced entrepre-
neurs, the risk-neutral VC expects as payoff
 (8)
… where RG,CM is the payoff charged to a manager in 
state G, and R’n,cM is the payoff charged to a manager 
with n experiences, none of them successful.  clearly,
… where n > 1.  In other words, the longer it takes for 
a manager to succeed, the higher is its cost of capital. 
Moreover, once the manager concludes a successful 
venture, his cost of capital drops to the lowest level 
in this market.  
In order to allow some level of entrepreneurship in 
the conservative market, we must have X > RG,CM (new 
ventures are led by managers that gained successful 
experience in other markets, or by funding their own 
successful projects) or X > RCM (venture capitalists may 
fund inexperienced managers).  As long as X > R’n,CM, 
managers that failed their first n projects may attempt 
yet another venture.  the appendix summarizes the re-
sults in this and in other sections.
Subcase b) experimental financial market
the experimental market encourages a high level of 
entrepreneurship.  It does so by keeping the cost of 
capital low for failed entrepreneurs, so managers that 
observe less-than-stellar signals about their projects 
may be comfortable to abandon them to start new 
ventures that might provide better payoff.
If the entrepreneur sees the signal pH, he is expected 
to complete the project — he cannot obtain a bet-
ter signal than this.  Yet, there is one valid concern 
in this situation: since the cost of capital for failed 
entrepreneurs is not punitive, the Vc must adopt in-
centives that lead to the completion of projects that 
receive a good signal.  Hence,
Notice that by including the possibility of complet-
ing a mediocre project in second period, the inequal-
ity makes it even more profitable for the entrepre-
neur to continue the high-prospect project.  If the 
signal is pM, the entrepreneur in this market prefers 
to drop the project and start a new venture.  to in-
duce this behavior:
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Again, the possibility of completing both high-
prospect and mediocre projects next period makes it 
even more profitable to abandon mediocre projects 
in the first attempt.  Combining these two expres-
sions, the incentive compatibility constraints in the 
experimental market are as follows:
 (9)
Observe that the expression on the left is less than 
1, and the one on the right is greater than 1.  Hence, 
surprisingly, the cost of capital for failed entrepreneurs 
may or may not be higher than for first-timers:  in this 
market, 
  
REM  may be greater than 
  
′ R EM  or not.  the 
pool of first-time failed entrepreneurs includes man-
agers that chose to fail after seeing pM and managers 
that failed after seeing pL (because of competence or 
not).  In the eyes of the Vc, the probability that a 
first-time failed manager is competent is:
  (10)
the risk-neutral venture capitalist, not knowing 
if competent managers lead the projects that she 
funds, requires this return on investment:
  (11)
the transition diagram in Figure 2 shows that, over 
time, the entrepreneur can be in five different states 
in the experimental market. After n ventures, a man-
ager that has seen pH at least once finds himself in 
state (G,K) because he is good, and this is publicly 
known. If he has seen pM at least once but never saw 
pH, he is in state (G,U) because he is good, but he 
can’t credibly convince the market that he is because 
he has never concluded a project.  If he never ob-
served pH nor pM, he is in state (U,U) if he is good, 
or in state (B,U) if he is bad, but he can’t possibly 
know which is true.  to ensure that entrepreneurs in 
state (G,K) always conclude high-prospect projects 
and always forego mediocre projects, the incentive 
compatibility constraints are:
… where m is the number of failed ventures since 
the manager last experienced a successful project. 
these constraints simplify to:
 
(12)
Since the entrepreneur concludes only those projects 
that have high prospects, the Vc expects her return on 
investment from entrepreneurs in state (G,K) to satisfy:
  
(13)
Figure 2.  Transition diagram (5 states)
If the entrepreneur has never completed a project, 
the Vc does not know if he is competent (even if the 
entrepreneur once received a private signal indicat-
ing that a project had mediocre prospects, a signal 
available only to competent entrepreneurs).  In the 
eyes of the Vc, the probability that a manager with 
n prior experiences without success is indeed a com-
petent manager is: 
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(14)
If the manager has observed pM at least once, he is in 
state (G,U); he knows that he is competent for sure, 
but the market does not know.  to ensure that he 
concludes high-prospect projects but abandons me-
diocre projects, the market imposes constraints that 
are similar to the ones for state (G,K):
these incentive compatibility constraints simplify to:
 
(15)
Moreover, the Vc expects return on investments 
from entrepreneurs that are not in state (G,K) to be: 
  
(16)
the manager that only received signal pL after n expe-
riences does not know if the projects failed because of 
him or not.  His probability of being in state (U,U) is:
  
(17)
If he sees pL once again, he still doesn’t know if he 
is a competent or a bad manager. He abandons and 
restarts a new venture because, according to the in-
centive compatibility constraints, (X – R’n + 1, EM) > 0, in-
dicating that the venture capitalist is willing to fund 
another project at a cost that is acceptable to the entre-
preneur. Hence, unlike those in the conservative mar-
ket, entrepreneurs in the experimental market always 
have an opportunity to attempt a new venture, de-
spite the number of failures they have experienced.3
This case explained the difference in the tolerance 
3 this result is quite intriguing, but must be taken with a grain of 
salt. As it is currently modeled, the whole payoff for both the VC 
and the entrepreneur occurs at the end of the project, if it is suc-
cessful.  Hence, the entrepreneur’s personal effort is not being 
considered.  If his time and effort is included in the model as a 
reservation price, and since θn → 0 as n increases, we expect that 
after n* failures, the entrepreneur will choose not to invest more 
time on his very questionable entrepreneurial talent.
to failure in different venture capital markets.  As 
recently discussed in the media (the Economist, 
2007), many European and Asian governments have 
poured substantial fortunes to create industrial clus-
ters – usually located near a large university where 
innovation may be found – in an attempt to replicate 
the continued successful experience in the Silicon 
Valley.   Similar effort is in progress in Russia (The 
Economist, 2010). However, while European venture 
capitalists risked only $9B in new ventures in 2006, 
the American counterparts risked 5 times as much in 
the same period.  these numbers indicates not just 
the difference in the willingness to take risk between 
the financial institutions in both regions, but also 
their willingness to accept entrepreneurs with failed 
experiences, curtailing or encouraging innovative 
ideas in each region.  Hence, in addition to (or de-
spite of) governmental incentives to encourage en-
trepreneurial activity, an over-arching entrepreneurial 
culture that tolerates failure is necessary to find societal 
entrepreneurial success.
2.3 Case III:  Corporate-funded Employee
In this case, we introduce a corporation that invests 
an amount I to launch a project under the leadership 
of an employee.  Employee initiated projects are at 
the heart of the quality improvement or cost reduc-
tion efforts at General Electric, Wal-Mart, and many 
other organizations recognized for their “opera-
tional efficiency”.  If successful, both company and 
employee have positive payoff.  For the corporation, 
the payoff R is the project return.  For the employee, 
the payoff X could be a promotion, a raise or greater 
“reputation” among colleagues.  Notice that in this 
environment, R >> X, so we do not consider the im-
pact of X on R.
If the project is not successful, the company loses the 
initial investment, and the employee suffers a loss 
-K, which may be immaterial, damage to his repu-
tation, loss of credibility among colleagues, demo-
tion, or even loss of employment.  A risk-neutral em-
ployee initiates his project if the expected value of 
his payoff satisfies
Hence, projects are initiated only if:
  (18)
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the employee also has to deal with market imper-
fections because the employer does not know about 
his competence to complete a project until he has 
completed at least one.  Like the Vc, the corpora-
tion expects that all projects with high prospects are 
brought to completion, and that mediocre projects 
be handled according to the organization’s willing-
ness to accept risk.4
In period 0, the employee initiates a project that ma-
tures in period 2.  In period 1, the employee receives 
a private signal p about the project. the employee 
trades off the potential gain (pX – (1 – p) K) for con-
tinuing the project with the certain loss for abandon-
ing it immediately (-K).  consequently, the employee 
continues if X > -K, which is always true, as long as 
the signal p is greater than 0!5  Moreover, once the 
employee abandons or concludes his project, he may 
choose to take on another project with payoff space 
(X, K’).  Whether the employee continues or foregoes 
the project upon receiving the signal depends on the 
signal received and on the corporation’s tolerance to 
failure, which we discuss below.
Subcase a) experimental corporation
We call experimental corporation one that encour-
ages entrepreneurship from its employees, and is 
tolerant to unsuccessful initiatives. consequently, if 
the employee receives a mediocre signal in period 
1, the employer expects him to abandon the project 
and start a new one. In order to induce this behav-
ior, the reward for continuing the mediocre project 
should be less than the potential value of starting a 
new project.  If the employee receives a signal pM, he 
knows that he is competent.  Hence, to induce aban-
donment and encourage the employee to restart at 
new project, we have that:
If the employee receives a signal pH, the employer 
expects him to continue the project, because the pay-
4 This is in stark contrast with the financier’s recommendation that 
all projects with positive NPV should be brought to fruition… 
However, most corporations prefer not to engage all projects with 
positive NPV.  rather, the typical corporation limits the amount 
of debt that is committed in a given time period.
5 In fact, if the signal is p = 0, the employee is indifferent between 
stopping and continuing a project that has no future.  In prac-
tice, this type of masochism would probably not occur, since the 
manager would accrue no satisfaction by investing additional 
time and effort in a project that will certainly fail.  To incorporate 
this dissatisfaction in the model, it suffices to make K marginally 
larger for projects starting in period 2.
off of continuing a good project is greater than the 
payoff of abandoning it and starting a new venture. 
Hence, to induce continuation: 
Simplifying these two expressions leads to the in-
centive compatibility constraints in this scenario:
 
(19)
On the other hand, the employer does not know if a 
failed employee abandoned the project after seeing a 
mediocre signal, which means he is competent, or after 
receiving a low signal, which means his competency re-
mains unproven. the risk-neutral employer, not know-
ing if competent employees lead the projects that she 
funds, requires that each venture meet the threshold:
  
(20)
the transition diagram in Figure 2 can also be used to 
describe the five states of a corporate entrepreneur in an 
experimental organization.  After n ventures, a manager 
that has seen pH at least once finds himself in state (G,K) 
because he is good, and this is publicly known.  to en-
sure that the entrepreneur always concludes high-pros-
pect projects and always foregoes mediocre projects, the 
incentive compatibility constraints are:
… where m is the number of failed ventures since 
the manager last experienced success.  these con-
straints simplify to:
 (21)
this incentive compatibility constraint applies both 
to managers that have experienced past success as 
well as to those that are observing pH for the first time. 
Since the employee concludes only those projects that 
have high prospects, the employer funds projects 
proposed by employees in state (G,K) that satisfy:
 
 (22)
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After n-1 attempts, if the employee has observed 
a signal pM at least once, but never observed pH, he 
knows that he is competent, and he has just as much 
chance as any employee in state (G,K) to manage a 
project successfully.  However, he may have been 
stigmatized for his continued lack of success.  to en-
sure that he continues to propose new projects, the 
experimental organization limits his stigma to:
 
 (23)
this is the second incentive compatibility constraint 
in the experimental corporation.  It ensures that em-
ployees in state (G,U) have the opportunity to take 
on new projects.  Finally, if the employee never ob-
served pH nor pM, he is in state (U,U) if he is good, or 
in state (B,U) if he is bad, but either information in 
unknown to him.  He does not know if his projects 
failed because of him or not, and he suffers the un-
avoidable personal loss each time his project fails. 
His probability of being competent is:
 
 (24)
considering that his probability of being competent 
decreases with each attempt, the failed entrepreneur 
starts a new project only if:
Employees who have not yet concluded any proj-
ects are in state (G,U), (U,U) or (B,U), and the em-
ployer cannot distinguish them.  In the eyes of the 




Hence, the employer funds projects initiated by 
employees that are not in state (G,K), and that have 
failed n projects, if they satisfy:
 
 (26)
this threshold limits the scope of new ventures and 
the number of attempts by employees without suc-
cessful experience. Yet, this model shows tolerance 
from the employer that keeps encouraging employ-
ees even after they have encountered failure more 
than once. this tolerance is an important ingredi-
ent in the experimental organization, which reas-
sures the innovative employees that they need not 
be afraid of bringing their ideas forward because, if 
the idea is funded but it does not succeed, their ca-
reers are not in jeopardy. the signals indicate that 
breakthrough innovations are more important for 
the corporation than gradual improvements that can 
be achieved with “safe” ideas.
Subcase b) Conservative corporation
A conservative corporation is defined as one that 
avoids high-risk projects. It entertains and sponsors 
innovative ideas as long as they are “safe” to deliver. 
In this environment, an employee will propose ideas 
that can be easily executed and supports the status 
quo.  the project is initiated in period 0 to conclude 
in period 2. If the employee observes the private sig-
nal pH or pM in period 1, he is expected to complete 
the project rather than taking on another venture. 
Because his career is on the line, his personal payoff 
is greater by continuing the venture than by aban-
doning it, which leads to:
Consequently, the first incentive compatibility con-
straint is:
 (27)
With this constraint, an employee that observes 
pH in period 1 would consider nothing other than 
continuing his project. However, if the employee 
observes pL, he abandons and suffers personal loss, 
but he may still engage in a new project. the risk-
neutral employer, not knowing if inexperienced 
employees are competent, requires that their ven-
tures meet the threshold:
 
 (28)
the transition diagram in Figure 1 represents the 
four states of competence in conservative corporate 
entrepreneurship.  If the manager’s records show at 
least one successful event, he is in state G.  More-
over, he is expected to finish all projects for which he 
gets a private signal pH or pM in period 1. thus:
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… where m is the number of consecutive failures 
since the last success. Since the employer concludes 
all projects that have high or mediocre prospects, the 
employer associates employees in state G with the 
risk level given by:
 
 (29)
Even conservative organization want to ensure some 
level of entrepreneurship. this is achieved by con-
straining the stigma to:
 
 (30)
If the records show that an employee has observed 
only failures, neither he nor the employer knows if 
he is good or not. the probability that he is in state 
U (possibly competent), given that he has seen pL in 
all n ventures that he has experienced, is:
 
 (31)
considering that the probability of being competent 
decreases with each failed attempt, the failed entre-
preneur starts a new project only if:
 
 (32)
to fund the next venture suggested by experienced 
employees that are not in state G, the employer re-
quires that the enterprise meet the threshold:
 
 (33)
Corporations that fit this model usually curtail their 
access to leapfrog innovation.  this is not necessar-
ily bad, if the organization operates in a mature in-
dustry where leapfrog opportunities are extremely 
rare.  By establishing greater hurdles to innovation, 
the organization is forcing the employees to contrib-
ute within the boundaries of known technologies or 
methods of gradual (or marginal) improvements.
Subcase c) Ultra-conservative corporation
We call ultra-conservative the corporation with ex-
tremely low tolerance for project failures.  In such 
an environment, employees that failed once face 
high hurdles to lead future projects. this type of or-
ganization would stigmatize failed managers, mak-
ing sure that, if they observe pM, they complete the 
project; and if they observe pL, future projects won’t 
receive corporate support. Obviously, some entre-
preneurship is desirable, so successful employees 
are well-rewarded for completing their projects.
If an employee observes pM, he avoids the stigma of 
failure and continues his project. continuing the proj-
ect has a better personal payoff than abandoning:
this incentive compatibility constraint is similar 
to the one in the conservative corporation.  the 
risk-neutral employer, not knowing if competent 
employees lead the projects that she funds, re-




Likewise, a manager that observes pL suffers person-
al loss (–K) and abandons the project.  the probabil-
ity that he is a competent employee is:
 
 (35)
to ensure that the failed employee does not initiate 
a new venture, his personal payoff in a second at-
tempt must be negative.  This is achieved by setting 
a high stigma for failing a project a second time (K’), 
which is constrained by the expression:
 
 (36)
For the ultra-conservative employer, the implicit risk 
in projects led by managers that have failed is: 
 
 (37)
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vironment is a dangerous gamble since, after a suffi-cient number of experiences, all managers eventually fail and become stigmatized.  To avoid this predica-ment, employees avoid projects with any risk level: they become bureaucratic and limit themselves to the most basic innovations (high πH) or those with least relevance and lowest consequence (low K).  An orga-nization might choose this approach to innovation if it operates in very mature markets, or in the presence of a management team that lacks vision.
Figure 3.  transition Diagram (3 states)
2 ReSeaRCh IMplICaTIoNS
2.1 Corporate culture and incentives for corporate 
entrepreneurship
Our model is related to the strategic management lit-
erature on corporate entrepreneurship. research on 
corporate entrepreneurship suggests that, in some 
environments, a significant relationship exists be-
tween entrepreneurial behavior and performance in 
organizations both large and small (Zahra & Covin, 
1995). Whereas Landier’s concern is with the entre-
preneurial culture of industries and regions, a central 
concern in strategic management theory is the role of 
corporate culture in nurturing employee behaviors 
that may ultimately lead to competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1991). Corporate culture may be viewed 
as, “a substitute for explicit communication. That is, 
culture is an unspoken language giving directives 
to the members of an organization” (Cremer, 1993). 
Burgelman (1983) suggests that senior management 
is influential in setting the environment for employee 
behaviors by how they manage failure in their organi-
zations. In his formulation, Burgelman (1983, p. 1361) 
asserts, “Autonomous strategic behavior emerges, by 
definition, spontaneously. Corporate management 
thus need not encourage entrepreneurship; it need 
only make sure not to suppress it.”6 Other scholars have 
also argued that core organizational values and be-
liefs play a fundamental role in nurturing corporate 
entrepreneurship (Guth & Ginsberg, 1990; Zahra, 
1991). Stevenson and Jarillo (1990, p. 24) argue that, 
“the treatment of failure would appear to be a critical 
component of the necessary motivation to pursue op-
portunity.” Indeed, they hypothesized that organiza-
tions that attach less negative consequences to failure 
would exhibit more entrepreneurial behaviors. In an 
experimental study, Lee, Edmondson, thomke, and 
Worline (2004) have identified tolerance for failure is 
indeed an important variable influencing employees’ 
willingness to engage in experimental behaviors.
Our study contributes to this literature by showing 
that a particular aspect of corporate culture (the ex-
tent to which the culture stigmatizes failure) can be 
modeled as a relatively simple information asym-
metry problem as proposed by Landier (2005). the 
central insight generated in Landier’s paper is that 
multiple equilibria may arise corresponding to dif-
ferent attitudes of entrepreneurs and capital markets 
towards entrepreneurial failure.  Landier’s model is 
supported by an empirical study by Bengtsson (2005), 
who examined data on the restart behavior of failed 
entrepreneurs in different geographies. Bengtsson 
found that the disproportionately large amount of 
venture capital activity in california could partly be 
explained by Californian investors attaching a lower 
stigma to failed entrepreneurs. Landier’s paper also 
corresponds with anecdotal data on the role of the 
stigma of failure in different geographies and indus-
tries, such as differences between investor attitudes 
towards failure in the US, France and Japan. 
A good test anecdote for our model may be found 
in reports about Jeff Immelt’s efforts to transform 
6 Emphasis added.
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GE into a “corporate innovation machine”. Despite 
his predecessor’s best efforts, Immelt inherited from 
Jack Welch an organization in which it appears that 
people are still afraid of undertaking risky, innova-
tive behaviors. According to a Business Week inter-
view with the new boss, “In his GE, the new impera-
tives are risk-taking, sophisticated marketing, and 
above all innovation.”  Accordingly, Immelt has told 
his top management team that, “You’re not going to 
stick around this place and not take bets.”  risking 
failure is inherent in taking bets on implementing 
innovations. However, under Welch’s leadership, 
people were rewarded above all for making their 
numbers (mainly through cost cutting). This allowed 
GE to be the model of steady earnings increases and 
continuous improvement (in line with its Six Sigma 
initiatives). But the culture of “make your numbers 
or else” is antithetical to the cultural context required 
to encourage employees to try out entrepreneurial 
gambits that might deliver innovations. After all, cul-
tures and policies that above all reward managers 
that make their numbers are just the kinds of cultures 
that bust people for failing. recognizing the impor-
tant influence of the organizational context for risk 
taking, Immelt has started “pushing for a cultural 
revolution.” (Business Week, 2005).
2.2 Incubating new business initiatives as separate 
entities
Our model also contributes to the literature regard-
ing when innovations are commercialized within 
established organizations and when they are com-
mercialized using corporate ventures that are stand-
alone divisions of a corporation (Christensen, 1997). 
In recent years, a literature that addresses methods of 
commercializing innovations was developed (Gans & 
Stern, 2002; Cassiman & Ueda, 2006; Hellmann, 2007; 
Klepper & Sleeper, 2005). The underlying question is 
if an innovation is instigated by an existing organi-
zation or if it is commercialized by an independent 
start-up. However, there is also the related question 
of when (and why) an existing organization chooses 
to set-up a separate, wholly-owned venture for the 
commercialization of a new business idea, rather 
than to develop the new business within its exist-
ing organizational infrastructure. For instance, when 
IBM developed the Pc, it established a new venture 
based in Florida, away from the parent company 
infrastructure in New Jersey. Similarly, Lockheed’s 
famous skunk works was deliberately set-up as an 
independent venture outside the corporate organiza-
tion, albeit wholly owned by the parent. Our model 
suggests one possible explanation for such decisions: 
the independently managed organizations are free 
to develop their own (more experimental) culture, 
less encumbered by the (conservative) culture of the 
parent organization.  As such, they can develop an 
appropriate cultural regime that includes different 
expectations about the way to treat failure. this sug-
gests that partitioning corporations into divisions 
may sometimes be motivated by efforts to establish 
different cultures with regard to failure management. 
to use an analogy, corporations may have their own 
Californias (i.e., divisions that attach a low stigma to 
failure), and they may have their Japans (i.e., divi-
sions that strongly penalize failure). Initiatives that 
support minor improvements would be implement-
ed within the low-risk divisions. High-risk initiatives 
that induce major process redesign would be tested 
within high risk divisions.
2.3 developing entrepreneurship inside organiza-
tions
the existence of a cognitive basis for domain-spe-
cific expertise (as delineated by Baron & Ensley, 
2006; Mitchell, Smith, Seawright, & Morse, 2000; 
Sarasvathy, 2001) suggests that entrepreneurial suc-
cess (especially over the course of several ventures 
or an individual’s career) may be a function of skill 
rather than luck. If this is the case, could there be 
ways of evaluating entrepreneurial talent directly, 
rather than relying on vicarious inferences drawn 
from the success or failure of entrepreneurial ven-
tures?  Who would have the strongest incentives to 
invest in improving the independent evaluation of 
entrepreneurial ability? Are there coordination dif-
ficulties among entrepreneurs and evaluators that 
result in path-dependence in the development of en-
trepreneurial talent in a corporation? 
Per our previous remarks, in Landier’s formulation, 
stigma of failure is an informational problem.  Like 
many other informational problems, there may be 
multiple ways of — at least partially — solving this 
problem.  Organizations (such as corporations or, in 
the case of independent entrepreneurship, venture 
capitalists) may be able to improve their screening 
processes by investing in formal evaluation pro-
cesses that enable them to more accurately assess 
the entrepreneurial abilities of individuals indepen-
dently of success or failure in past ventures. Formal 
organizational structures, such as human resources 
departments, also have the authority to directly ob-
serve individuals and collect significant quantities 
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of data about them (for example, using 360-degree 
evaluation processes). Even venture capitalists may 
develop skills in screening and evaluating entrepre-
neurial talent, independent of the particular invest-
ment opportunities offered to them.
One upshot of our model is that, to the extent that 
corporations can lower the cost of evaluating entre-
preneurial skill levels, direct evaluation may substi-
tute the indirect inferences stakeholders draw from 
venture failure about the entrepreneurial skills and 
abilities of individuals. One can infer from our mod-
el that a change in the cost of evaluation technolo-
gies would lead to different “cultural” equilibriums 
in organizations, developing corporate cultures that 
would be more accepting of entrepreneurial failure. 
If corporations could better identify high-ability indi-
viduals who failed in previous ventures, they could 
offer them a lower cost of capital in future ventures. 
this would encourage more innovation from skilled 
employees and create value for the firm.
there are, of course, several problems in investing in 
screening entrepreneurial skills.  One is that before a 
corporation can accurately identify employees with 
entrepreneurial skills, they need managers who are 
themselves entrepreneurially skilled. A recent paper 
by Bernhardt, Hughson, and Kutsoati (2006) stud-
ies the strategic incentives that this creates. to sum-
marize, workers are likely to distort investments to-
ward skills that a firm’s managers can best evaluate 
(as well as attempt to manipulate evaluator’s judg-
ments about their skills by their choice of project 
and by manipulating perceptions about their role 
in project successes and failures — Amit, Glosten, & 
Muller, 1990; Holmstrom, 1999). In a dynamic con-
text (in which workers one day become managers), 
the population of skills in an organization may skew 
over time. this may explain the low levels of entre-
preneurship in many corporations: it suggests that 
the development of corporate entrepreneurship de-
pends on having a combination of managers (skilled 
entrepreneurial evaluation) and employees (skilled 
entrepreneurship).
Another closely related issue is identified in a study 
by Gromb and Scharfstein (2003).  It concerns the 
reassignment of failed “intrapreneurs” within a 
corporation.  In their model, the critical assump-
tion is that firms and markets differ in their ability 
to observe and retain information about the skills 
and abilities of individuals.  Intrapreneurship en-
ables firms to learn about individuals and redeploy 
failed, but able, managers to new projects within the 
firm.  Poorly performing intrapreneurs are stigma-
tized: no one wants to hire them because those that 
are on the job market are ones that established firms 
have chosen not to retain. By contrast, being a failed 
independent entrepreneur is not as bad a signal as 
that associated with being fired from an established 
firm: independent failure does not convey as much 
information about the ability of the entrepreneur. 
Gromb and Scharfstein’s model thus adds another 
dimension to the analysis we develop in this paper 
by highlighting the role that more- or less-accurate 
information regimes may have in stigmatizing indi-
viduals. Again, the underlying insight is that noisy 
information regimes (i.e., experimental ones) are 
less likely to result in a stigma of failure than re-
gimes in which inferences about individual abilities 
can be made more accurately (i.e., more conserva-
tive regimes). 
3 IMplICaTIoNS FoR pRaCTICe
the central message of this study for practice is quite 
intuitive and quickly summarized.  New technologies 
vary in their implementation risks and organizations 
vary in how they treat managers who fail.  conser-
vative organizational cultures penalize managers for 
failing.  this creates incentives for managers to pur-
sue safe projects that are unlikely to fail, and avoid 
taking risks in projects.  This makes it difficult for the 
organization to projects associated with cutting edge 
new technologies.  At the limit, ultra-conservative 
organizations may drive out risk-taking behavior 
altogether.  General Motors, usually described as a 
conservative organization, did not fully just-in-time 
methods until the year 2000 (Glass, 2010).  Glass ex-
plains General Motors’ recent worries in light of its 
low corporate entrepreneurship that led to the inabil-
ity to nurture new ideas, even when shown evidence 
of success, which led to poor operations.
to nurture new technologies organizations need to 
support some level of risk, by developing experi-
mental cultures in which failure isn’t actively penal-
ized.  this is an easy suggestion to make, but much 
harder to actually execute. An important implica-
tion for practicing managers is that in the context of 
the generally conservative cultures of many well-es-
tablished organizations, managers might be wise to 
heed to the potential stigma from being associated 
with projects that have a high (ex ante) risk of fail-
ure. they may do this in some subtle and baroque 
ways, as well as in candid ways.  In either case, a ma-
jor implication is that organizational culture matters 
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because it influences the choices that project manag-
ers make. Faced with the unsavory prospect of being 
penalized, managers are more likely to choose safe 
projects and shun risky decisions. Several observ-
able behaviors would be consistent with the incen-
tive structure that exists in a generally conservative 
organizational context (what we have modeled as 
the “conservative corporation”), such as: 
All other things equal, project choice tends to favor 1. 
the implementation of “safe” projects rather than 
go “out on a limb” to implement risky ones with 
unproven technology; the result for the organiza-
tion as a whole is that its portfolio of future proj-
ects will contain mostly low-risk bets that lead to 
moderate returns. they will rarely contain risky 
projects with greater organizational pay-offs.
All other things equal, individual project manage-2. 
ment may involve too much (rather than too little) 
risk analysis and too many risk mitigation proce-
dures.  conservatism with regard to risk may ben-
efit the project manager, not the organization.  This 
encourages projects management processes that 
are potentially too conservative in the context of 
the organization’s entire portfolio of projects.  Al-
though the organization has greater means to bal-
ance its portfolio of risky bets than the individual, 
risk is avoided at the individual level.
All other things equal, project managers should 3. 
engage projects whose success or failure is trans-
parently linked with external variables.  this 
would reduce the risk of being blamed for the 
project failure by other organizational actors, 
generating trade-offs between the incentives to 
bring projects more firmly under the control of 
project managers in order to manage them ef-
fectively, and incentives to let the fortunes of a 
project be driven by visible external stakehold-
ers and exogenous public processes. 
Many of the effects highlighted in this study are quite 
subtle and evade easy empirical detection, though 
we believe they are nonetheless realistic.  For ex-
ample, take project delays. regardless of the actual 
reasons for delay (and there may be many) what we 
have observed how easily extraneous factors can be 
summoned up by project managers to justify them. 
this is precisely the kind of phenomenon we would 
anticipate based on our model’s results.
Not surprisingly, greater tolerance for failure leads 
entrepreneurs to take more risks, both in the financial 
market and in the workplace. What is perhaps less 
intuitive, however, is that organizations with greater 
tolerance for failure will generally see more frequent 
improvement of their processes, which explains the 
continuous success in quality improvement and cost 
reduction in some corporations.
this line of argument leads us to believe that our 
results may have strong practical application in the 
public sector as well as in private sector organiza-
tions.  According to a popular resource on corporate 
entrepreneurship (Morris and Kuratko, 2002), the 
term entrepreneurship has appeared with increas-
ing frequency in the public administration literature 
since the early 1990s.  However, public organizations 
typically exhibit a cluster of tightly connected and 
highly conservative behaviors and therefore would 
be expected to stigmatize failure in significant ways. 
Indeed, according to Morris and Kuratko, “There is 
also career-related risk in the public sector, for al-
though it is difficult to fire people, advancement can 
be hampered by visible failures” (p. 309). Our model 
indicates that ultra-conservative organizations and 
government institutions are usually characterized 
as such; they will drive out entrepreneurial behavior 
since after a sufficient number of trials, all managers 
will eventually fail and become stigmatized.  Hence, 
managers will propose only the easiest or least sig-
nificant innovations; in other words, such organiza-
tions become bureaucratic.
to conclude, in this paper we have provided a model 
that supports a contingent view of stigma of failure 
in organizations. It explains why the creation of in-
novative products and processes requires a forgiv-
ing culture that encourages experimentation, which 
brings both success and failure as the organization 
develops superior operational performance. the core 
results of our paper in fact rest on very simple and 
intuitive assumptions about human behavior: that 
people take context into account as they watch each 
other and make attributes about the quality of each 
other’s skills.  they then use this information to form 
judgments about who is a great project manager and 
who is a failure, and how these individuals should 
be treated. Because our model is contingent, it sup-
ports two types of accounts of organizations that 
have emerged in contemporary society: both those 
(such as Scott Sandage’s historical/cultural account 
- Sandage, 2005) that suggest stigma of failure to be 
a fundamental (albeit socially constructed) charac-
teristic of culture that cannot easily be escaped by 
modern organizations; as well as those that suggest 
that in some organizations failure might be (even if 
just occasionally) worn as a badge of honor.
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